Few studies explain how wars affect trade with third parties. We argue that wartime trade policies should raise trade with friendly and enemy-hostile third parties, but reduce trade with hostile and enemy-friendly third parties. At the same time, the private motivation of firms and households may be incompatible with national wartime trade policies and constrain the effectiveness of wartime trade policies.
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Introduction
The rapid growth in international trade and investments that took place since the end of the Second World War has inspired hopes for a more peaceful world. Such hopes were mainly based on the proposition that interdependent states have ever more to lose by initiating hostilities against each other, because war disrupts trade. Serious quantitative research of this proposition started to develop after Polachek's (1980) (Hegre, 2004; Herge, Oneal and Russett 2010; Mansfield, 1994; Oneal and Ray, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Weede, 1995; Xiang, Xu and Keteku, 2007) . 2 A related literature argues that it is capitalism that induces peace, by promoting investments, economic development and financial and monetary integration (Gartzke, 2007; McDonald, 2009; Mousseau, 2013) . Gartzke and Li (2003a) and Russett and Oneal (2001) found that trade openness in general as well as bilateral trade reduces the 1 For a full review of the scientific literature on Commercial Liberalism see Barbieri and Schneider (1999) , Mansfield and Pollins (2003) , and Schneider (2010) .
2 Barbieri (1996; dissented, but Xiang, Xu and Keteku (2007) attributed her findings to methodological issues (Schneider, 2014) . Other scholars conditioned the pacifying effects of trade on the existence of democratic national institutions (Gelpi and Grieco, 2008) or Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000) and on the inelasticity of import demand and export supply (Polachek and McDonald, 1992) . Polachek (1980) and Pollins (1989b) preferred to use events data to show that trade increases (decreases) cooperation (conflict). tendency to be engaged in MID. Souva and Prins (2006) arrived at similar conclusions with particular regard to fatal-MID.
The "costly signals" literature argues that trade and financial openness discourages war, not because of opportunity cost but because it improves communication between potential combatants. Openness allows decision makers with incomplete information about the resolve of the opponents, to signal their willingness to incur economic costs (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001; and Gartzke and Li, 2003b) . 3 More recently, the Social Network Analysis literature analyzes how indirect trade via third parties reduces the likelihood of MIDs between dyad of states, perhaps by allowing mediation by a third party (Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Kinne, 2012; Maoz, 2009; Poast, 2010) . Lupu and Tragg (2013) argue that countries in the same trading community (as identified by the community detection tool of network analysis) are less likely to go to war with one another. However, Bohmelt (2010) finds the opposite: trade links to third parties actually reduce the likelihood of mediation.
While most of the literature explains the likelihood of MID or outright wars and their effects on trade between combatants, few studies explain how wars affect trade with third parties. The few that do, tend to refer to all third parties as if they were a single player with uniform sensitivity to the conflict. This approach does not address the different national 3 However, Polachek and Xiang (2010) argue that opportunity costs are the decisive factor in decreasing the probability of war even in signaling models.
interests of third parties and the separate effect that war may have on business-driven trade with third parties.
This study contributes to the literature by arguing that trade between a combatant state and a non-combatant state increases (falls) when they have similar (opposing) interests, but decreases (rises) when the non-combatant state has similar (opposing) interests with the enemy. In other words, trade rises with friendly and enemy-hostile third parties, but falls with hostile and enemy-friendly third parties.
At the same time, the private profit motivation of firms and the benefits to households from trading with counterparts in non-combatant states may not be compatible with national wartime trade policies. In cases of such misalignment of motivation, trade with third parties may adversely affect the effectiveness of wartime trade policies. Firms and households may not necessarily be inclined to act as foreign policy tools of governments and may attempt to evade government policy.
The third section sets out the research design. We innovate with a directed dyadic dataset of almost 860,000 observations, which consists of almost all of the states from 1885 to 2000. This dataset improves the external validity of the findings (smaller datasets reflect the effects of specific wars), avoids selection bias (which occurs when only part of the available data is used) and enables better controls for omitted variables (by distinguishing export flows from import flows) in accordance with new methods developed in the field of trade economics in recent years. In the fourth section, we use this dataset to test our hypotheses and support our argument with High Definition Fixed Effects regressions applied to a Gravity model and discuss the results. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 4 first analysis of the impact of conflict on trade that uses two-way clustering to address the interdependence between dyadic trade observations. The fifth section provides conclusions.
National interests and the cost of war
Wars and lower forms of MIDs between states often involve partial or full trade embargoes and boycotts. On top of government actions, MIDs, especially outright wars, raise the costs to private agents of engaging in trade with agents from a belligerent state. Risk premiums increase, and the violence, destruction and regulations burden logistics. Nationalistic chauvinism distorts household and business decisions. This is empirically documented by a vast literature, which with some exceptions mostly found that trade flows between combatant or otherwise adversarial states fall significantly, as bilateral political relations deteriorate.
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In contrast, the effect of MIDs on trade with third parties has been the subject of fewer empirical studies. Glick and Taylor (2010) , Hegre, Oneal and Russett (2010) and Long (2008) found that MIDs impede trade with third 4 See Anderton and Carter, 2001; Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004; Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins, 2010; Kim and Rousseau, 2005; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Oneal, Russett and Berbaum, 2003; Polachek, 1980; 1997; Pollins, 1989a; 1989b; Reuveny, 2001; Reuveny and Kang, 2003; Russett and Oneal, 2001 . For different results see Barbieri and Levi, 1999; Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000; Morrow, Siverson and Tabares, 1998; and Reuveny and Kang, 1998. parties in addition to the decline in trade between the adversarial states. Their findings contrast with those of Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) , who found that MIDs have very marginal effects on third parties. Gowa and Hicks (2015) found that during the First World War trade with third parties, be they neutrals or allies, actually increased.
Wartime trade policies aside (see discussion below) wars reduce business-driven trade between corporations in combatant states with corporations in third parties. Within combatant states, the sectors that are not essential to the war effort tend to contract because of either physical destruction to their production capacity, or reallocation of resources to the production of war-essentials. In addition, the purchasing power of households in combatant states and their demand for non-war consumption and investment products tend proportionally less between one depressed (combatant) economy and one non-depressed (non-combatant) economy than between two depressed (combatant) economies. In other 6 words, firms and households in a combatant state can rely to some extent on the better business environment in non-combatant states.
Second, wars can actually increase trade with some third parties, which provide substitute export markets and import sources to those lost among the warring states, as well as substitute for lost domestic production capacity or decline in non-war sectors. For example, see the increase in trade of combatant states with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands during the First World War (Gowa and Hicks, 2015) , as well as with the US as a third party, before it entered the war. Indeed, British exports and reexports to Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands tripled in 1914. Danish shipments increased nine times over (Osborne, 2004, 93) .
Third, Ceteris Paribus war should jeopardize international transportation (on which international trade is dependent) especially when the transportation routes run close to the theatre of war. Mines, stray projectiles and mistakes in identification create a dangerous environment. To the extent that wars are fought at or adjacent to at least one of the combatant states, they are likely to disrupt transportation between combatants more than between them and third parties. For example, during the Tanker War, as part of the IranIraq war in the 1980s, mines or missiles mistakenly hit some third party vessels in the Gulf (Cordesman, 1990) .
Finally, trade with third parties does not suffer from the same degree (if any) of animosity and chauvinism, which increase transaction costs of otherwise mutually beneficial trade between firms and households from opposing combatant states. For example, during the tension between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 2012, Chinese protesters rioted for several weeks damaging Japanese-made cars, vandalizing stores selling Japanese products, and setting a Panasonic factory on fire. Some Chinese state media outlets listed Japanese brands to boycott (Katz, 2013) . For all of these reasons we expect that trade between combatants and non-combatants should on average fall by a lower proportion than trade between the warring states.
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In addition to these effects, some trade is lost, and some gained due to third parties' wartime trade policies, which they pursue in accordance with their national interests. In general, we can expect that a third party C with relatively similar national interests to those of a combatant state A will try to assist A in times of peace and especially in times of war, by increasing its trade with A and restricting its trade with A's enemy -state B (Figure 1 ). Figure 1 ). This means that the trade of each combatant state A with a third party C is expected to rise in relation to the degree of similarity of interests between them (or fall as their interests become less similar). Conversely, trade between A and C is expected to 5 Sometimes trade between direct belligerents can continue during hostilities, as Barbieri and Levy (1999) show. However, there is no evidence that trade with third parties did not continue as well, or even rise, so it is hard to draw firm conclusions about the balance of war effects in such cases.
Likewise we can expect that
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fall in relation to the degree of similarity of interests between B and C (or rise as their interests become less similar). We can summarize this discussion with the following two hypotheses:
H1: When a state is at war, the greater is the similarity of national interests between it and a third party, the more it will trade with that third party.
H2: When a state is at war, the greater is the similarity of national interests between its enemy and a third party, the less it will trade with that third party. Sometimes public opinion actually leads policy and the government is pushed to impose sanctions on a disliked state (Whang, 2011) .
Conversely, states can increase their trade with each other (at least between various agencies and state-owned enterprises of the two states) by way of formal, informal and indirect action too, by taking the reverse direction on all of the actions described above (Peterson and Drury, 2011) . Indeed, Gowa (1994) , Gowa and Hicks (2013 and 2015) , Gowa and Mansfield (1993) , and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) argue that national security interests influence commercial ties and find that alliances promote trade.
However, the private profit motivation of firms and the benefits to households from trading with counterparts in non-combatant states may not be compatible with national wartime trade policies. In cases of such misalignment of motivation, trade with third parties may adversely affect the effectiveness of wartime trade policies. Firms and households may not necessarily be inclined to act as foreign policy tools of governments and may attempt to evade government policy.
Research design
Our directed dyadic dataset covers 116 years in annual frequency and 191 different countries and territories for which trade data is available (up to 183 countries in any given year). We exclude the post-2000 years for lack of consistent data on similarity of national interests.
The dependent variable is the log of annual nominal USD merchandise exports from one state to another, taken from the Correlates Of War (COW) 2.0 database (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins, 2008) . In order to allow the logarithmic transformation of trade flows, we code observations with zero trade as having a value of USD 1,000, which is the minimum value recorded in international trade. 6 Thus, for every pair of states the trade flow in each direction forms a separate observation.
Distinguishing exports from imports of a given country is necessary for the method that we 6 Alternatively, scholars use Oneal and Russet's (2005) data, but it does not distinguish exports from imports. Some use Gleditsch's (2002) trade data, which codes missing observations as zero trade if both states appear in IMF reports. However, that dataset does not cover the pre-1950 period. Nevertheless using it for the regressions in Table 2 below provides similar support for our hypotheses. use to control for omitted variables (see below). As a result, there are 857,435 trade observations. This dataset improves the external validity of the findings (smaller datasets reflect the effects of specific wars) and avoids selection bias (which occurs when only part of the available data is used).
As in most studies on the effect of war on trade, the hypotheses are tested with a gravity equation, which explains trade as driven by the importing nation's demand variables (its GDP and consumer price index), the exporting nation's supply potential (its GDP and market access factor), but hampered by transaction costs (including bilateral distance and price mark-ups). Measurement, data availability and instrumentation problems lead many empirical studies to omit such important variables (as well as domestic and international political variables). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) , Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) , Baldwin et al. (2008, 39-42) , Gowa and Hicks (2013 and 2015) and Sadeh (2014) control for such variables with Exporter-Year Fixed Effects (EYFE), Importer-Year Fixed Effects (IYFE) and CountryPair Fixed Effects (CPFE). We accept that this method is least likely to produce biased estimates. By greatly reducing the scope for omitted variables, it is also a very powerful Baldwin et al. (2008, 10-17) , Bergstrand (1985) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) for a more detailed exposition. method in minimizing endogeneity of variables (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 77-79) . We discuss the potential for remaining endogeneity below.
We run a High Definition Fixed Effects regression absorbing three categorical variables: a pair identifier, an exporter-year identifier and an importer-year identifier (to control for respectively, the CPFE, EYFE and IYFE). Note that the sum of all EYFE and IYFE is equivalent to a set of year dummies.
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We thank Sergio Correa for directing us to the development version of reghdfe, which allows two-way clustering of the errors.
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to a non-member of the same club/block (noted with the suffix EX), and a club/block member importing from a non-member of the same club/block (noted with the suffix IM).
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WAR is a dummy variable scoring in each observation 1 for a war between the particular pair of states in the particular year. This coding is based on the interstate war list taken from the COW database, which defines war as involving sustained combat by organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a 12-month period. Since only states that committed at least 1,000 troops and suffered at least FRIEND is an index of similarity of national interests between the two states in each observation, to control for the effect this may routinely have on bilateral trade. We expect the coefficient of FRIEND to be positive. We use Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S index of similarity of the two states' portfolios of alliances as a proxy for the similarity in their national interests, based on the data in EUGene (Bennett and Stam, 2000; Signorino and Ritter, 1999) . This index ranges from -1 (perfect dissimilarity of policy portfolios) to 1 (perfect similarity). Two different variants of the index are used, both weighing alliances according to the allies' military capabilities, but one of them considers only regional alliances (S Weighted Regional in EUGene) and the other considers all alliances (S Weighted Global).
We regard both variants of FRIEND as exogenous to WAR and trade. Indeed, the Pearson correlation coefficients (r) of WAR with S Weighted Regional and S Weighted Global in our dataset are respectively -0.0008 and -0.0111. 12 We also regard trade as reflecting 12 Of course, states with conflicting interests are likelier eventually to go to war with each other compared with states that have similar interests. However, since this data has a time dimension, these low Pearson coefficients mean that the degree of similarity of interests is a poor predictor of the timing of war. security interests rather than causing them. Even if states form some alliances in order to protect trade, note that our measures are based on similarity of alliances within each dyad, not necessarily any actual alliance between the two states.
We interact WAR3 and FRIEND in order to capture the effect of trade-stimulating wartime policies resulting from the similarity of interests between one of the states, which is at war 
Results
In Table 1 Regression (1) is a basic gravity specification. In Regression (2) WAR and WAR3 are added. As expected trade has been significantly lower between warring states (by exp(-1.01)-1 = 64 percent on average) during the study period. Because we control for CPFE, EYFE and IYFE, the historical state of bad relations between war combatants, which is not unique to war years cannot explain this finding. Nor can other events particular to any year or particular to any state explain this result. However, as explained above we cannot tell whether war reduced trade, more than trade reduced the incidence of war. Trade with third parties was lower too, but by a smaller proportion (23 percent). Since Regression (2) does not control for the similarity of national interests this effect aggregates political and businessmotives in trade with third parties. Regressions (3)- (4) (4) suggests that global military powers were on average less engaged in peacetime strategic trade.
The overall effect of similarity of interests on trade with third parties (i.e. the marginal effect of FRIEND on the dependent variable when WAR3=1) is given by the sum of coefficients of FRIEND and WAR3×FRIEND, which is reported at the bottom of the table.
Regression ( (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002) , and . The insignificance of the third-party coefficients of PTAs and currency blocks is probably the result of the multitude of bilateral arrangements involving small countries, which affected a limited number of third parties. (Gowa and Hicks, 2015) . Thus, as a robustness check Table 2 reports the results of the same regressions as in Table   1 , this time eliminating the pre-1950 data. Because of the small number of states before 1950, and the quadratic effect that this has on the number of dyads, the number of observations falls only by roughly 44,000, or roughly 5 percent of the total. However, the number of WAR observations coded 1 falls by more than 15 percent. A number of differences in the results of Tables 1 and 2 
Conclusions
Trade is commonly expected to reduce interstate violence if militarized conflicts harm trade among adversaries and with third parties; this study indeed provides evidence that wars are associated with reduced trade. However, few studies explain how wars affect trade with third parties. The few that do, tend to refer to all third parties as if they were a single player with uniform sensitivity to the conflict. This approach does not address the different national interests of third parties and the separate effect that war may have on businessdriven trade with third parties.
Of course, the private profit motivation of firms and the benefits to households from trading with counterparts in non-combatant states may not be compatible with national wartime trade policies. In cases of such misalignment of motivation, trade with third parties may adversely affect the effectiveness of wartime trade policies. Firms and households may not necessarily be inclined to act as foreign policy tools of governments and may attempt to evade government policy.
Methodologically, this study innovates with the largest dataset ever used in this literature, which distinguishes exports from imports rather than aggregate them, and encompasses all countries and territories with trade statistics between 1885 and 2000. This dataset improves the precision of the estimates and the external validity of the findings, and enables better controls for omitted variables. We apply a particular set of fixed effects to a Gravity model based on recent advances in the field of trade economics, two-way clustering, and use recent software developments.
We find that hostile third parties, especially global military powers, tended to reduce trade with a combatant state by roughly 30 percent. In addition, trade with third parties friendly to the enemy fell by a similar magnitude. In contrast, war hardly affected business-driven trade with third parties. It seems that the ability to substitute trade with adversaries and local output for trade with third parties, and the better business and transportation environment in third parties compared with the war-ridden economies of the combatant states, balanced the negative effect of wartime economic recession in non-war sectors and naval blockades. This result may explain conflicting empirical findings in existing literature, especially when confined to particular episodes and states.
As a robustness check, we repeat the same tests without the pre-1950 data and find that war depressed trade with third parties more significantly. We believe this result reflects the lower substitutability of trade flows after 1950, which form global supply chains, compared with trade in finished goods that is more typical of earlier periods. However, in spite of the growing opportunity costs, wartime trade policies, especially trade obstruction by hostile non-combatant states, became only more effective after 1950.
Admittedly, our results are based on a period that ended 14 years ago, and thus may not consider recent patterns of behavior. In addition, our study does not consider the direct costs of wars in terms of lost life and property, as well as the direct financial cost of wars
